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The US patent system is often thought to 
play a vital role in promoting innovation 
and spurring economic growth. Indeed, 
that is the primary utilitarian justification 
that animates US patent law. In recent 
years, however, scholars have debated 
whether the contemporary patent system 
impedes rather than promotes innovation 
and is thus in need of fundamental 
reform (e.g., Jaffe and Lemer 2004; 
Burk and Lemley 2009). Responding to 
interest-group lobbying, Congress, too, 
has considered major changes to the 
patent system for several years, even 
though it has not yet enacted any in light 
of significant disagreement about the 
effect of proposed reforms. In PATENT 
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS 
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, authors 
James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer 
argue that too much of the contemporary 
patent reform debate is based on 
anecdote, rhetoric, and idealized 
assumptions about how patents actually 
work rather than on sound data. 
PATENT FAILURE is an ambitious and 
challenging book that seeks to change all 
that by marshalling an impressive array 
of empirical data on the US patent 
system to inform issues of patent law 
and policy. Bessen and Meurer agree 
with critics that the US patent system is 
broken, and the main goal of PATENT 
FAILURE is to demonstrate how and 
why this is so and to propose directions 
for patent system reform. 
The opening chapter presents an 
overview and summary of the book's 
main arguments, which is particularly 
helpful given both the complexities of 
patent law and the extensive amount of 
data analyzed in the book (which is 
intended for a general audience). The 
next section of PATENT FAILURE 
(chapters 2-4) lays the groundwork for 
Bessen and Meurer's central thesis that 
patents fail to "work as property." By 
this, the authors mean that patents, a 
type of "intellectual property" that 
protect rights in intangibles, fare badly 
when compared with private property 
systems that protect tangibles (such as 
land) -with deleterious economic 
consequences. Specifically, the 
contemporary patent system fails to 
provide adequate notice of the legal 
rights patents confer, so that patent 
owners and potential infringers alike 
often cannot readily ascertain who owns 
what rights - a degree of legal 
uncertainty Bessen and Meurer argue 
would be intolerable in a system of 
tangible property rights. This "notice 
failure" (the inability to provide 
predictable property rights) undermines 
the economic utility of patents and 
therefore the effectiveness of the US 
patent system (pp.53-54). 
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Bessen and Meurer critique some of the 
main legal doctrines and institutional 
practices that have weakened the notice 
function of patents and exacerbated 
patent system uncertainty since the 
1980s. The targets of their criticism 
include the Patent and Trademark Office 
(the "PTO"), the administrative agency 
that examines applications and issues 
patents, and the US Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), 
which since 1982 is the centralized 
appellate court for all patent litigation 
(Abramson 2007). Bessen and Meurer 
criticize the PTO for allowing vague 
patent claims to issue, which are 
subsequently enforced by the courts 
(pp.57-58). They are also critical of the 
practice of filing so-called 
"continuation" patent claims, which 
allow inventors to "hide" modifications 
to pending (and even published) 
applications and thus to delay public 
awareness of exactly what inventors 
claim as their property right - a practice 
that has grown seven-fold since 1984 
(pp.62-63). Bessen and Meurer fault the 
Federal Circuit for failing to develop 
workable guidelines to assist lower 
courts in interpreting the meaning and 
scope of patent claims and for 
employing a de novo standard of review 
for claim interpretation on appeal. 
These practices prevent a definitive 
ruling on the meaning of patent claim 
language until a late stage in litigation, 
thus prolonging uncertainty as to what 
the relevant legal rights at issue are. The 
Federal Circuit and many district courts 
also are to blame, the authors contend, 
for unduly expanding patent owners' 
rights by increasingly interpreting 
abstract patent claims very broadly, 
particularly in the areas of software and 
"business-method" patents (pp.64-68). 
All of these problems, along with the 
sheer "flood" of patent applications 
(which have more than tripled since the 
1990s) weaken patent notice and thereby 
increase costs and uncertainty in the 
patent system (pp.68-7 1). 
Chapter 4 of PATENT FAILURE 
explores further the authors' argument 
that patents fail to work as property by 
comparing the relative effects of tangible 
property rights and patent rights on 
economic growth. This chapter is based 
on an extensive review of a by-now very 
substantial literature - including 
economic history, comparative 
econometric studies, and natural 
economic experiments. Surveying and 
synthesizing this literature, Bessen and 
Meurer highlight various ways that, 
when compared with systems of tangible 
property, patents do not necessarily 
provide the level of economic benefit 
they are often assumed to generate. 
Having thus made the argument that 
patents do not always promote economic 
development, as is often assumed, in 
Chapters 5 and 6 Bessen and Meurer 
creatively estimate the benefits and costs 
(primarily the tremendous costs of patent 
litigation, which have exploded since the 
mid- 1990s) respectively of patent 
ownership from the 1970s to the present. 
These chapters are based on an 
impressive synthesis of empirical data, 
including the authors' own previous 
studies, on US public companies. The 
findings are striking. Perhaps the most 
important conclusion presented is that 
the benefits of patent ownership vary 
dramatically between industries. Indeed, 
the authors conclude that since the 1990s 
it is only in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries that the 
benefits of patent ownership clearly 
outweigh the costs (p. 140). For most 
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other industries, particularly high-tech 
and computer and soRware companies, 
patents act as a disincentive to 
innovation (p. 141 -46). 
The next several chapters further explore 
how and why the US patent system's 
failures are best understood as resulting 
from the historically recent, but 
increasing, deterioration of patent notice. 
Chapter 7 evaluates potential alternative 
explanations for the decline of the patent 
system, such as increasing business-to- 
business litigiousness, the rise of patent 
"trolls" - who enforce patents but do not 
manufacture or commercialize any 
products - or the supposed decline in 
patent examination quality in the PTO. 
Bessen and Meurer conclude that patent 
notice decline is the strongest 
explanation that comports with the 
empirical evidence. Chapter 8 details 
particular notice problems that affect 
small companies. And Chapter 9 
focuses on the specific - and acute - 
notice problems associated with abstract 
software and business methods patents. 
The substantial contribution of PATENT 
FAILURE lies in its careful, 
comprehensive, and ultimately quite 
convincing marshalling of empirical data 
to demonstrate the book's main thesis: 
how and why over the past two decades 
the US patent system has become 
dysfunctional for all but a few actors and 
industries. The final two chapters of the 
book advocate for numerous reforms to 
both patent law and institutions aimed at 
alleviating some of the uncertainty that 
Bessen and Meurer show increasingly 
hobbles the patent system. These 
reforms include: strengthening the "non- 
obviousness" requirement for 
patentability (p.236); instituting a 
deferential standard of review in the 
~ e d e r d  Circuit to patent claim 
interpretations made by the PTO (during 
the application process) and the federal 
district courts (during patent litigation) 
(p.237); creating specialized trial-level 
patent courts (p.238); requiring patent 
applicants to draft clearer patent claims 
and permitting the PTO to issue opinion 
letters on patent claim interpretation 
(pp.230-240); mandating early 
publication of patent applications and 
eliminating expansive post-application 
amendments (pp.242-243); creating 
special burdens for the patentability of 
most software and business-methods 
patents (pp.243-247); increasing the fees 
for required renewals of issued patents 
(p.247); and strengthening certain 
defenses to patent infringement lawsuits 
(pp.248-25 1). 
This lengthy list of proposed reforms is 
somewhat daunting, which is perhaps 
not surprising given the nature and 
extent of the problems that PATENT 
FAILURE carefully explicates. Bessen 
and Meurer are forthright about their 
uncertainty that any of the reforms they 
advocate will actually work: "We are 
sure reform is needed but it is hard to 
say how effective any of these reforms 
will be or how successful they would be 
together at fixing the patent system" 
(p.235). Moreover, the authors 
recognize the likely formidable political 
resistance to reform that might be 
expected from powerful actors who 
benefit from the current patent system 
(e.g., the pharmaceutical industry or the 
patent bar) (pp.256-260). Yet they 
suggest that political resistance to reform 
may recede precisely because the patent 
system is increasingly dysfunctional for 
even those it currently benefits (p.259) 
(not a fully convincing argument) and 
that a flexible and data-driven approach 
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to reform is necessary (which seems AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO 
pragmatic and correct). DO ABOUT IT. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
There is much room to debate whether ..................... 
the authors make a convincing case for O Copyright 2009 by the author, 
any particular reform proposal. William T. Gallagher. 
Moreover, readers of PATENT 
FAILURE may not be sanguine about 
the likelihood that Congress or other 
policy-makers even care about, much 
less rely on, empirical data to inform 
their decision-making. But this book 
successfully demonstrates that they 
should. Ultimately, PATENT FAILURE 
is a significant contribution to the 
growing literature on the problems and 
promise of the US patent system. The 
book is at times a challenge to read 
because it is so dense with information 
and with multiple arguments intended to 
bolster and test the authors' main theses. 
But PATENT FAILURE rewards careful 
reading and is a book that cannot 
credibly be ignored by anyone seriously 
concerned about the fate of the US 
patent system. 
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